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ABSTRACT
In this paper we critique much of the empirical literature on the important po-
litical science concept of presidential approval. Much of the recent research on
presidential approval has focused on the dynamic nature of approval; arguments
have raged about whether presidential approval is integrated, co-integrated, or
fractionally integrated. We argue that none of these time-series concepts, im-
ported from an econometrics literature which has fundamentally different types
of data than do political scientists, can apply to the presidential approval time
series. Instead, we advocate careful use of aggregated approval as a time-series
cross-section, or the use of individual-level survey responses. Ultimately most
of the important hypotheses political scientists wish to test regarding presiden-
tial approval involve individual voters or citizens; thus we argue that using the
appropriate data unit is the best methodology.
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Presidential approval has been a central concept in the study of both presidential power
and public opinion. With the advent of the “new presidency” in the age of mass media
politics, having high levels of approval is seen as an important political resource for presidents
(Kernell 1986). Having high levels of approval is thus a central component of presidential
power (Neustadt 1990), and influences electoral outcomes and legislative success (Brody 1991;
Rivers and Rose 1985; Simon and Ostrom 1989).
Since the early 1970’s, a long list of articles and books have examined presidential ap-
proval, almost exclusing from a time-series perspective. In general, these scholars have ex-
amined changes in the percentages of survey respondents who claim to approve of the job
which the current president is doing as a function primarily of “rally events”, economic con-
ditions, and various time-related effects (Beck 1991, 1992; Brody 1991; Kernell 1978; Kiewiet
and Rivers 1985; MacKuen 1983; Ostrom and Simon 1992; Ostrom and Smith 1992; Smith
1992; Williams 1992). More recent work on presidential approval has focused intensely on
the dynamic properties of this important concept. Ostrom and Smith (1992), for example,
proposed an error correction model for the presidential approval series based on their results
which indicated that this time series is integrated, or near-integrated (at least for the Reagan
years).
In this paper, we challenge this approach to studying presidential approval. Our first
concern is that the dynamics attributed to the aggregate presidential approval series are
often logically inconsistent and always substantively implausible. The most problematic
models of the dynamics presidential approval assume that it is an integrated series. As we
will show, there is no way for a bounded series, such as the approval series, to be integrated.
However, even the dynamic models that are not integrated, such as the fractionally integrated
and standard ARMA models, lead to substantively odd findings. For example, if we are to
believe these models, the boost in approval Bush received during the Gulf War was also
helping to increase Clinton’s approval twenty-four months later.
This puzzling spillover effect is caused by aggregation, which is our second major concern.
Most studies have assumed that the presidential approval series is in effect a single, long
series. However, it is not clear from any theory why we should think that approval should
pool across presidential administrations. In fact, when we turn to our empirical examination
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of the Gallup presidential series, the most commonly used series, it seems that the dynamics
of approval seem to vary significantly between administrations.
Pooling across administration, however, is no the only aggregation problem that we find
in the current studies of presidential approval. There is also the problem of aggregating up
from the individual survey respondences. The theories we are interested in testing are usually
stated at the level of the individuals, however it is only rarely the case that we can test such
individual level claims with aggregate data, particularly when there is heterogeneity in the
population.
The paper proceeds as follows. In the first consider the dynamics of the aggregate presi-
dential approval, assuming this is a valid quantity of interest. In this section, we also briefly
review the basics of integration. The next section, then turns to the problem of aggregating
across administration. The third section, then considers the issue of aggregation bias and
heterogeneity at the level of the respondent using actual individual level data from the Gallop
Organization. The final section concludes.
1. THE DYNAMICS OF PRESIDENTIAL APPROVAL
Most recent studies that have examined presidential approval data, typically from the Gallup
Organization, start with the implicit or explicit assumption that it is a single time series.
The central focuses is the dynamic behavior of the series, particularly on its mememory
properties. This typically boils down to whether or not the presidential series is “integrated”
(and possibly co-integrated with some other series, such as various measures of the economy).
In this section we argue that even under the maintained assumption that the approval series
is a single time series, an assumption that we will question below, it is logically impossible for
the approval series to be integrated. We start this section by briefly reviewing what it means
for a series to be integrated. We then present an argument for why presidential approval can
not be integrated. We conclude the section by examining the case where the series is not
integrated, but long memoried. We show that this, too, is problematic.
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1.1. Integration: What Does It Mean?
What does it mean for a series to be integrated or process an “unit root”? In order to
understand this, we will need to understand the broader idea of a stationary distribution.
Recall that we are interested in making inference about the data generating process of some
random variable, in our case the monthly survey marginals on presidential approval. If we
knew the distribution, F (y), of our random variable we would know all we can about the
process. Typically we assume that we know this distribution up to some set of unknown
parameters, θ, and use maximum likelihood techniques to estimate to them (King 1989).
One of the properties that we might be interested in is whether or not F (y) is stationary.
Informally, we say a series is stationary if its distribution — data generating process — does
not vary over time. Stationarity is of interest both to understand the underlying causal
mechanism as well as to better forecast a series; failure to account for non-stationarity will
lead to mis-specification and possibly mistaken inferences.
More formally we can define a series to be strictly stationary if the distribution of the
series does not change if we look τ periods ahead or behind. Violation of strict stationarity
can occur for many reasons. The simplest possibility would be some sort of structural break
that fundamentally changes the data generation process. Given that we are working with
survey marginals, a possible cause of such a structural break would be a change in the wording
of a survey instrument. An example of how such structural break might occur — and the
ways in which it would lead to problematic substantive inferences — occurred in the late
1960’s and early 1970’s when the National Election Studies changed the format of their issue
preference questions, which set off a flurry of research first asserting that American politics
had become more issue oriented during that period (Nie, Verba and Petrocik 1979; Pomper
1972). But subsequent research questioned whether American politics had really changed,
or whether the changes in the National Election Studies questions produced an illusion of
change (Bishop et al. 1978; Kessel 1972; Sullivan et al. 1978).
While strict stationarity is useful to think about, it is typically more then we can assume
in practice. In general, we can neither test for strict stationarity nor can we estimate a fully
non-stationary model, since by construction this means every observation comes from its
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own unique distribution. Instead studies usually focus on whether the mean and variance
of the data generating process are stationary. We say that a series is weakly stationary or
covariance stationary if:
E[y
t
] = µ for all t
E[(y
t
− µ)(y
t−j
− µ)] = γj for all t and any j.
In other words, a series is covariance stationary if its mean and variance do not depend on
time and the covariance between any two observation is only a function of how far apart they
are.
Even within the class of covariance non-stationary models, researchers have typically
restricted themselves to either integrated or trend stationary series. An integrated series is
one that can be made covariance stationary by taking first differences. The simplest example
of such an integrated series is a random walk with drift :
y
t
= µ+ y
t−1
+ ²t (1)
where ²t is a mean-zero random variable (often called a shock) with finite variance, σ
2
² . This
can be re-written by repeated substitution:
y
t
=
t∑
s=0
(µ+ ²s). (2)
It is easily shown that the variance of yt is:
var(y
t
) =
t∑
s=0
σ²
= tσ².
Note that here we have assumed that the constant (or drift parameter) is fixed (i.e., non-
stochastic) so that it does not contribute to the variance. From this we can see that the
variance is a function of time and hence the distribution of y
t
is non-stationary. But note
more is true: the variance is explosive. As the series runs on for longer and longer, the
variance gets larger and larger. In the limit, the series will have an infinite variance.
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We can also show that the mean of the series is non-stationary if µ 6= 0. Again we use
the repeated substitution and then take expectations:
E(yt) =
t∑
s=0
µ+ E(²s)
= tµ.
Thus the mean is also explosive if the y
t
’s have non-zero means.
However, if we re-write Equation 1 by taking first differences, often denoted by ∆y
t
, we
get:
y
t
− y
t−1
= µ+ ²t (3)
This differenced series, which is also a random variable, is (covariance) stationary because its
mean is constant, E[y
t
−y
t−1
] = µ, and its variance is both finite and constant, var(y
t
−y
t−1
) =
σ². Since the expected value of a stationary series is constant, it is often called a “mean
reverting series”. The shocks, ²′ts, just move the series around its mean. On average there
should be as many negative shocks to offset the positive ones. That is, if we were to graph
out such a series, we would just see random fluctuations around the mean value.
In contrast, such a graph of an integrated series would tend off to either plus or minus
infinity never returning to any particular level. That is, a integrated series is infinitely
memoried, a particular shock in period t affects the series forever bummed up or down
depending on the sign of the shock. This can be seen by looking at the recursion that
defines yt given in Eq. 2. To restate this point, a shock to an integrated time-series
has permanent, and never-decreasing, effects. This is a simple, and straightforward,
implication of the fact that the time-series process of an integrated phenomenon is constantly
and systematically changing over time.
Series which become stationary after taking their first differences are said to be integrated
of order 1 and denoted as I(1) series. It is obvious that a time-series might become stationary
after taking the second or third differences, and those time-series would be called I(2) or I(3)
series. It is possible that a series can be made stationary after fractional differencing, a topic
we will return to below.
In fact, it is now widely accepted that many economic time-series are integrated. Most
macroeconomic time-series which are tied to population growth are I(1) time-series — ex-
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amples are economic output and employment — and examination of these undifferenced
time-series across the past few decades show that they are constantly increasing. This fact
leads to very real substantive implications about the nature of these time-series and the
effects of attempts by macroeconomic policymakers to affect changes in national output or
employment.
Integration also has important consequences for the empirical models we try to fit to
integrated series. First, assume that we have an I(1) series like that given in equation 1.
But, let’s now assume that we fit a simple regression model to this time-series, of the sort
which were once common in the empirical literature on presidential approval:
yt = xtβ + ηt, (4)
where xt is some I(0) (or stationary) variable, such as an event dummy for Eisenhower’s heart
attack. Fitting a regression model to equation 4 is clearly incorrect. First, given that yt is
I(1), this implies that the disturbances violate the usual assumptions necessary to obtain the
standard desirable OLS properties. Second, there is a serious inconsistency in this regression
model, since we have two different types of variables — one which is I(1), and which is
consequently drifting over time in a positive or negative direction with an infinite variance
and one which is stationary over time with constant variance. Given these two problems, it
is not clear what inferences we can make about the coefficient we estimate in equation (4),
other than the fact that these inferences will probably be incorrect!
This is not to say that I(0) variables can not be used in models of I(1) processes; they
just can not be used to model the levels. The alternative is to model the differences of the
I(1) series, which by definition are stationary. So we can recast equation (4) as
∆yt = xtβ + εt (5)
where ∆yt is just yt − yt−1. We should note that the interpretation of β in 5 is different
than in the model of the levels. The xt now only effects the short-run movement of yt around
some trend line.
Another alternative is available if there is some other variable, say zt, that is I(1) and
cointegrated with yt. We will say that two, or more series, are cointegrated, if some linear
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combination of them is stationary. Formally, we say that two series are cointegrated if there
exists some γ such that
εt = yt − γzt (6)
is stationary. Loosely speaking two variables are cointegrated if they are both I(1) but they
are in a long-term equilibrium (in levels) such that neither wanders very far from the other
— in other words, they are trending along the same attractor.
Engle and Granger (1987) have shown that when two variables are cointegrated the model
can be written in error correction form:
∆yt = ∆ztθ + λ(yt − γzt) + xtβ + εt (7)
where εt is a stationary and mean zero error term. Futher we can allow εt to be be independent
and identically distributed or to be time dependent with some ARMA(p,q) process. What is
nice about the error correction model is that it incorporates both short term dynamics, by
the inclusion of ∆zt and xt, as well as long term changes in levels by the cointegrated term
yt − γzt.
Ostrom and Simon (1992) fit an error-correction model to the presidential approval series
and inflation during the Reagan administration. They argued that the presidential approval
and inflation are co-integrated. Further, they claim approval series is integrated or “near-
integrated” for the full span of their data (Truman through Reagan). This result has lead
to a number of papers focusing on integration in the presidential approval series (Beck 1992;
Ostrom and Smith 1992; Smith 1992; Williams 1992).
1.2. Can Approval Be Integrated, Theoretically Speaking?
Can the presidential approval series be integrated? Recall that if it were integrated, then we
are assuming it will have increasing (decreasing) mean and an explosive variance. Of course
in finite observed sample of an integrated series we will not literally see the variance and
mean tend toward infinity. However, we should see clear trending. In addition, we should
see that any shock to the presidential approval series should have a long-lasting effect. These
are simply the consequences of the assumed properties of an integrated time-series
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Figure 1: Monthly Presidential Approval, 1944–2000 : This figure plots the percentage of the
respondents that report that they approve of the job of the president in a given monthly
survey from the Gallop Organization. In months with more then one survey, the average
over the surveys is reported.
So as a first cut at this question we just plotted the monthly presidential approval series
from 1944 to 1996; the full descriptive statistics for the time-series are in Table 1. As
can be seen from Figure 1, there is not much of a trend even though we have about six
hundred observations! The series plotted in Figure 1 seems to regress towards the mean of
approximately 55, never getting close to either of the boundaries. Neither do we see any
obvious increase in the variance over the course of our sample. In fact , the variance of this
series seems to differ in different Administrations, as can be seen in Table 1, a point we
will return to later. Third, there are signs of many shocks in the time-series of presidential
approval graphed in Figure 1, but none of these shocks seem to have lasting and non-decaying
impacts. For example, Nixon’s popularity drops rapidly towards the end of his Administration
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Table 1: Summary Statistics of Monthly Gallop Poll Presidential Approval by Administration
Administration. N Mean SD Lag SD ADF
Truman 22 43.6 17.1 .88 .07 -2.43
Eisenhower 96 65.2 7.3 .55 .07 -4.16
Kennedy 35 70.2 7.0 .83 .10 -2.45
Johnson 61 55.3 13.3 .95 .04 -2.86
Nixon 68 50.3 12.4 .96 .05 -1.89
Ford 28 46.4 4.8 .26 .14 -2.58
Carter 48 46.0 12.5 .91 .06 -2.32
Reagan 96 53.1 7.7 .85 .05 -2.18
Bush 48 60.3 14.2 .88 .07 -2.63
Clinton 39 48.3 4.5 .62 .13 -2.85
Pooled Series 563 54.7 13.3 .91 .02 -5.41
as a function of the Watergate scandal — but once Ford takes office, the effects of the
Watergate shock dramatically reverse, and Ford’s popularity rapidly increases. Thus at first
take it does not seem at all appropriate to consider approval integrated, since the behavior
of this series clearly does not show the classic signs of integration.
One’s eyes can be deceived, hence the need for statistics. Our inter-ocular test need not be
conclusive, however we have a deeper and more fundamental reason to be deeply suspicious
of the assertion that approval is integrated: simply put, presidential approval is a bounded
series, so it is not possible for the mean or variance to explode.
In order to see this somewhat more formally we need to consider exactly what happens
at the boundary. There are two logical possibilities that we must consider: absorbing or
reflective boundaries. With absorbing boundaris when our process has an eventual realization
that hits the boundary, in our case 0 or 100, then the process will stay there forever. Such an
assumption would make sense if we believed that there was some underlying latent random
variable, say y∗t , that was integrated, and hence tending off toward ±∞, but we only observed
some monotonic transformation of it, such as the logistic, that kept it in bounds. Then, it is
very simple to see that the distribution of the observed yt would be stationary. For all t > T ,
yt would be either 0 or 100. So our distribution would be degenerate, but stationary (i.e.,
time independent) with mean either 0 or 100 and zero variance!
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The case of reflecting barriers is somewhat more difficult. Under reflective boundaries if
the process ever has a realization that hits the boundary, the following realization is bounced
back into the interior of the space. It can be shown that this leads stable (i.e., stationary)
distribution by noting that this random walk can be expressed as a Markov chain with
reflective boundaries. The case where the “states”, realization of yt, are finite then the
transition properties that define the process are stationary (see Feller 1968:436–8). This can
be extended, with some care, to the case of infinite (i.e., continuous) states.
Irregardless of whether we believe that the presidential approval time-series has absorbing
or reflecting boundaries, it is important to note that in neither case can this time-series be
thought of as integrated. This simple fact — that neither type of bounded time-series can
exhibit the fundamental properties of an integrated time-series — has been largely ignored
in past research.
A more recent alternative suggested by Box-Steffensmeer and Smith (1998) that seeks
to circumvent the problems of integrated process for models of survey marginal is fractional
integration. Recall that we made the I(1) series described in Equation 1 stationary by taking
first differences. In principle there is no reason why some series might be better fit by
only fractional differencing the data. We would call such a series fractionally integrated. A
fractional integrated series is also long memoried, but unlike an integrated series, its memory
is finite. If we were to observe the series for long enough it would eventually return to its
mean. This implies that both the mean and variance would be finite and hence not be
logically impossible for a bounded series, such as presidential approval. We note, however,
that over long stretches such fractionally integrated series could deviate far from their means
because of this long memory. That is, shocks could add up easily pushing the series out of
the bounds we know must hold. Thu,s before we would suggest using such a fractionally
integrated models for survey marginals, we would want to modify them to insure that they
did not produce values out bounds.1
1Another nice property of the fractionally integrated series is that they can be generated by aggregating
certain types of heterogeneity at the individual level (Granger 1980), hence they might be thought to solve
the aggregation problem we will discuss in the last section. The conditions of Granger’s (1980) aggregation
theorem, however, require that the individual series being summed be AR(1) processes. It does not seem
reasonable that this assumption holds for an individual response to an approval question. A more likely
model is that every respondent has some propensity to support the president when asked – i.e., a random
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2. POOLING PRESIDENTIAL APPROVAL ACROSS ADMINISTRATIONS
In the previous section we considered the problem of modeling aggregate presidential approval
as an integrated time series. In this section we take up the first of two aggregation issues,
whether it is reasonable to pool data across presidential administrations. We argue not since
pooling leads to theoretical problems because of “spill-over” across administrations. Further,
even without this theoretical concern, the data empirically reject homogeneity of approval
across administration. We will take these up in order.
2.1. Spill-Over
To begin, it is best to be a bit more persist in our model of the presidential approval series.
A standard and simple model to consider a simple AR(1) process:
yt = ρyt−1 + xtβ + εt ∀t = 1, . . . , T (8)
where yt is the presidential approval in month t; xt is a 1× k vector of exogenous regressors,
such as measures of unemployment and inflation; εt is some well behaved error term with
zero mean; and ρ gives the correlation between yt and yt−1. We note that much of the
literature has focused on the determining appropriate dynamic structure (see Beck 1991 for
details. Restricting ourselves to the case of AR(1) is not crucial for our insights as we could
easily allow a more general error structure, e.g. allow the errors to follow some ARMA(p,q)
process, but this would not change our general insights and just complicate estimation and
interpretation. We will also assume that |ρ| < 1, so the series is stationary (see section 1 for
a detailed argument).
The question at hand is what to do about the fact that periodically a new administration
comes into office? In our dataset, the presidential approval series starts in January 1944 and
run through June 2000, covering ten separate Presidents. The root of problem is that ρ is
really just the partial (conditional) correlation between {yt, yt−1}. We then have to ask why
should Bush’s approval in his last month in office (directly) effect Clinton’s approval in his
first month? This is implied, however, by the model as specified in Equation 8.
effect. Under such model aggregation will not lead to fractional integration.
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Beck (1995) has suggested a simple way to get around this problem, at least with regard
to estimation. He suggests excluding any President’s first month in office (via a dummy vari-
able). This will prevent any contamination in the estimation of the partial autocorrelation,
ρ, at the break points. However, this does not really solve the problem. Equation (8) defines
an infinite distributed lag model. To see this (ignoring regressors), suppose the series starts
at t = 0 with some initial value, y0, then:
y1 = ρy0 + ε1
y2 = ρy1 + ε2 = ρ
2y0 + ρε1 + ε2
...
yt = ρ
ty0 + ρ
t−1ε1 + ρ
t−2ε2 + · · ·+ ρεt−1 + εt.
Note that this last equation holds generally for any starting date t− 1, so
yt+j = ρ
jyt−1 + ρ
j−1εt + ρ
j−2εt+1 + · · ·+ ρεt+j−1 + εt+j (9)
Now consider the effect of some some shock in month t on some later period t+ j, which is
referred to as the dynamic multiplier and is defined by:
∂yt+j
∂εt
= ρj−1
This is easily seen by differentiating equation (9). So even though the first month of the
President’s term are excluded from the estimation of ρ, equation (8) still implies that “shocks”
to previous President’s approval can affect another President’s approval.
So what does this mean in practice? Figure 2 plots out the dynamic multipliers for
approval series assuming a ρ of 0.91, which is Beck’s (1995) estimate. This figure shows the
duration of the effect of a one percentage point shock in the presidential approval series for the
next 48 months. As you can see from the graph, there are sizable effects even two years after
the shock. Consider, for example, the hypothetical case of a 5 percent point shock to Bush’s
approval in February, 1991, caused by the Gulf War. The model as written implies that this
shock causes Clinton’s approval in February, 1993 (24 months latter) to rise by about half a
percentage point! Clearly this can not be what previous scholars have meant when they have
assumed models like Equation (8). We also note that this spill-over problem also exists for
12
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Figure 2: Presidential Approval Dynamic Multiplier : The figure plots out the impact of a 1
percentage point shock to an AR(1) series assuming a ρ of 0.91.
fractionally integrated models since by construction they are long memoried. Unfortunately
constructing their dynamic multipliers is more difficult. However, it can be shown that
any fractionally integrated series can be arbitrarily well approximated by a suitable large-
order ARMA representation (Hamilton 1994:449). Using such a representation, the spill over
argument presented above will hold.
2.2. Parameter Homogeneity
Even if we thought spill-over was not a problem, we can ask whether the data are consistent
with pooling across administration. Such a investigation is not merely an estimation nui-
sance, but can provide valuable insight into the underlying process that generates presidential
approval. Given our pooled structure, it is straightforward to ask if economic conditions effect
the approval of Democratic and Republican administrations in the same fashion, or whether
13
other factors which might influence approval positively in one Administration might work
against a subsequent president’s approval.
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Figure 3: Monthly Presidential Approval With Time Trend by Administration: This figure is
the same as Figure 1 accept time trends are included. The trends are estiamted by regressing
monthly approval on a constant and a time indicator.
In the rest of this section we will only really consider parameter variability with regard
to how to specify the dynamics in the model. That is we want to ask does the same AR(1)
dynamic fit all the administrations? Our first examination of this assumption is to re-examine
the plot of monthly presidential approval originally seen in Figure 1. Figure 3 is the same plot
except we have now included lines that represent simple time trends that vary by president.
As can be seen from the figure, there seems to be enormous variability in the overall time
trends. Most striking is the fact that Reagan and Ford’s approval both increase over the
course of their time in office whereas all other presidents approval decline. We also note that
the downward trend seems noticeably less step for Eisenhower and Clinton.
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Figure 4: Autocorrelograms for Presidential Approval By Administration: The figure plots
out the autocorrelation of the Gallop Presidential Approval series through lag 15 for each
Administration. A graph for the Truman administration is not presented because of missing
data. Values out side of the dashed lines represent a significant autocorrelation at the lag.
The next step in determining the homogeneity of the dynamics is to examine the cor-
relograms (see Box and Jenkins 1964 and Granger and Newbold 1977). If the correlograms
show a similar pattern, then we are in a better position to accept the assumption of common
dynamics. In Figure 4 we plot the correlagrams with standard error bars2, it is readily ap-
2Values outside the two error bars are statistically significant at conventional levels1
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parent that there seems to quite a bit of variation in dynamics across Administrations. The
oddest correlagrams is for Ford, although this seems somewhat explainable. Ford has only is
very short time series, since he was only in office for two years. It is particularly conforting
to note that all of Ford’s fluctuations are within the standard error bars so they are not
statistically significant. The other thing to note from the correlagrams is the high amount
of persistence in the series for Eisenhower, Reagan, and Johnson. We could also examine
the partial autocorrelograms by administration following standard time-series approaches as
advocated by Box and Jenkins (1964). We would see the same pattern: wide variability in
the dynamics by administration.
Instead of continuing with these fairly informal methods, we will directly test for for pa-
rameter homogeneity. A formal test can be constructed by estimating the model outlined
in Equation 8. We have done so, regressing monthly presidential approval from the Gallop
Organization on its lag as well as on changes in the consumer price index (CPI) and unem-
ployment, both lagged one month.3 In order to avoid problems of missing data, we will only
used data from January 1957, the start of the Eisenhower administration, through June 2000
of the Clinton administration. Our results from this regression agree with the rest of the
literature .Declines in both CPI and unemployment lead to statistically significant gains in
month approval. Further, the estimated partial correlation is 0.886 with a standard error of
0.018.
In order to test for homogeneity, we will allow all of the parameters in the regression to
vary by administration.4 There is some question as what to do about the constant term. We
have excluded other regressors that the some in the literature has used, such as indicators for
scandal or the first month of a new administration, which we find theoretically unjustified,
one might, therefore, expect to find fixed effect which are of little substantive concern. Al-
though strictly speaking, for homogeneity to hold all parameters need to be constant. Given
we are agnostic with regard to this issue, we tested allowing for fixed effects and the more
stringent criteria of complete homogeneity. Regardless, both tests lead to the same conclu-
sion, parameter homogeneity is rejected. The F-statistic for the restriction allowing for fixed
3The economic data come from the Bureau of Labor Statistics.
4This is easily done by interacting indicator variable for each administration with all regressors and the
constant.
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effects is 3.82. Given the degrees of freedom for the statistic of 24 and 534, we reject the null
hypothesis of pooling at all conventional levels. If we further require the constant to pool,
the F-test becomes 3.57 on 32 and 534 degrees of freedom, also leading us to reject the null
hypothesis of parameter homogeneity at all conventional levels.
A greater feel for the variability can be found in Figure 5. This plots out estimates of ρ by
administration with 95 percent confidence intervals. As you can see there is wide variability
between administration, The low is from Ford with an estimate of ρ at 0.24 and a high of 0.95
for Johnson. Even if we were to throw out Ford, since it was an odd short administration, the
range on the estimates of ρ run from 0.81 to 0.95, quite a bit of variability in the underlying
dynamics.
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Figure 5: Estimates of ρ with 95% Confidence Intervals by Administration: This figure plots
out the estimates of ρ, the parameter on the lagged approval in a regression that also includes
a constant term and measures of changes in unemployment and inflation. All parameters are
allowed to vary by administration.
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The theoretical problem of spill-over along with the failure empirically to accept homo-
geneity casts doubts on the use of a single presidential approval series as has been standard
practice in the literature. Even if these problems could be resolved, there is still one fun-
damental problem left to address. Recall that the approval data used in these analysis are
aggregated survey marginals; thus there is some process which aggregates individual-level
survey responses to aggregate survey marginals, and the model which explains variance at
the aggregate survey marginal level may not be the model which determines variance at the
individual-level. This is a problem of aggregation bias, much like that discussed in the eco-
logical inference literature (e.g., King 1997) and in the seminal work on economic voting by
Kramer (1983).
In fact, Kramer’s (1983) problem, the impact of economic outcomes on presidential can-
didate choice, is quite similar to the presidential approval problem. Kramer begins with
an individual-level behavioral model, where economic outcomes are partitioned into those
that are government- or randomly-induced, and both types of economic outcomes directly
determine which presidential candidate a voter chooses. Kramer then shows that a simple
aggregate time-series estimate of the relationship between economic outcomes and presiden-
tial election outcomes will generally be biased: “we should expect the aggregate time-series
estimate to be of the correct sign, although probably somewhat attenuated in magnitude”
(Kramer 1983: 100). Kramer also points out that the aggregate time-series estimate can-
not partition sociotropic behavior from self-interested pocketbook voting (Kramer 1983: 106).
Thus, Kramer’s work supports our basic argument throughout this paper; generally speaking,
the use of aggregated time-series data for studying presidential approval has both method-
ological and substantive problems.
3. TURNING TO AN INDIVIDUAL-LEVEL APPROACH
Is there anything that can be gained by moving from the aggregated time-series analysis of
presidential approval to an analysis of the individual-level presidential approval data? On this
point, Kramer (1983) was quite pessimistic, as he asserted that individual-level cross-sectional
studies of economic voting were at least as methodologically flawed as aggregate time-series
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studies. Yet Kramer’s assertions here rest on very strong assumptions; in particular, Kramer
consistently assumes that in any particular election year, the government-induced effect on
voter’s economic well-being across the nation is homogenous across the electorate, or that the
government-induced effect is smaller than idiosyncratic effects (Kramer 1983: 100-101). In
these two cases, individual-level cross-sectional analysis may indeed lead to biased estimates
of economic voting or of the effect of economic perceptions on presidential approval. On this
point, we do not share Kramer’s pessimism, as his assumptions about the homogeneity of
government-induced economic well-being effects seems quite unrealistic to us.
There are many merits to using individual-level data for studying presidential approval,
in addition to avoiding the types of aggregation biases and problems we discussed in the
previous sections of this paper. One obvious gain is efficiency, since we will have much
more information at our disposal to explain presidential approval; however, the ultimate
effect of this efficiency gain has been disputed (Beck 1991). A second obvious merit is that
there are important theoretical reasons for using the individual-level presidential approval
data, though, since ultimately our hypotheses which drive the specification of aggregate
presidential approval models are hypotheses about individual-level behavior. Thus to test
these hypotheses correctly, we should use individual-level data, not attempt to infer individual
behavior from aggregate models.
However, there is on looming problem with the use of individual-level survey data for
studying presidential approval — the availability of the individual-level survey responses.
In our opinion, the focus on the aggregate presidential approval series in the literature has
arisen largely because of the ease of aggregate data collection and analysis. The Gallup
Organization and the other major commercial polling firms make their survey marginals
available to the public, and these are easy and cheap to collect and analyze. Unfortunately the
major commercial polling first are not as forthcoming with their individual-level data, which
has inhibited their use to test hypotheses about individual behavior with the appropriate
data.5
5Of course, the National Election Study has included a presidential approval question in most of their
biannual surveys; also, there are a wide array of media polls from recent decades available from the ICPSR.
Unfortunately, the latter polls are not necessarily systematically archived in a public access facility like the
ICPSR, nor do they systematically include the same sorts of questions about presidential approval in their
survey instruments, making these polls difficult to use for the systematic study of presidential approval.
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We have access to the Gallup Organization’s polling data for the 1988 election; we focus on
the Gallup data here since it is exactly these surveys which are commonly used to construct
the aggregated measures of presidential approval which we examined in the previous sections
of this paper. During the span of January through October 1988, the Gallup Organization
asked their standard presidential approval question, “Do you approve or disapprove of the
way Ronald Reagan is handling his job as president?” in ten separate national telephone
surveys. We graph each of the possible survey response marginals in Figure 6.
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Figure 6: Presidential Approval Responses from Gallop Monthly Surveys in 1988 : The figure
plots out the marginals for the four possible responses to the approval question in the 10
Gallop Organization surveys for 1988 for which we have individual level data.
During the 1988 election the Gallup presidential approval survey marginals point to three
interesting dynamics. First notice that the rate of item non-response (in the graph as “NA”,
or “not available”) drops considerably during the presidential election campaign. This is
interesting since the item non-respondents are people who were not asked the presidential
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approval question in the particular survey — the Gallup Organization in 1988 did not ask
the presidential approval question of people who said they were not registered to vote, or
were not sure about whether they were registered to vote.6 Over the course of the election,
it is clear from Figure 6 that many more respondents become registered, or could recall that
they are registered, as the campaign season progressed. Thus, increasing numbers of survey
respondents were posed the presidential approval question as the election year progressed.
Secondly, during the 1988 election, there is a steady increase in the percentages of regis-
tered voters who approve of Reagan’s performance. This rise in Reagan approval during the
election campaign could be the result of changes in the economy during 1988, but could also
be due to campaign information — since one of the central components of the Bush election
campaign was the continuation of Reagan’s policies.
But third, notice that there is very little change in the percentages of registered voters
who disapproved of Reagan’s performance, or who did not care to express an opinion (the
“dk” in the Figure). That the percentages of registered voters who disapproved of Reagan’s
performance during the 1988 election hardly changed is fascinating, since it implies that
whatever factors were operating to drive Reagan’s approval upward were not operating to
symmetrically drive Reagan’s disapproval down. If the economy were improving steadily
during 1988, we would expect to see Reagan’s approval go up and his disapproval go down,
which we do not see in Figure 6.
What does show a downward trend during the 1988 election, though, is the percentage of
non-registered voters. The rise in Reagan approval seems to be driven by survey respondents
who either became registered voters, or who recalled being registered voters. Thus, the best
explanation for the rise in Reagan approval in the 1988 election is campaign activation.
In general, just by examining the entire distribution of responses to the Gallup Orga-
nization presidential approval question a number of interesting patterns can easily be seen.
This means that by concentrating only on the “approve of” responses, the literature on pres-
idential approval at best may have missed important conclusions which could be found only
by examination of the entire set of responses to this one survey question. At worst, this
6At this time we are not sure whether this is a common practice of the Gallup Organization in all of their
surveys, or whether this is a particular format they use in only election years. If the latter is the case, this
implies that election year and non-election year respondents to this question could be quite different.
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literature may have reached some erroneous conclusions.
Obviously there is more information in these surveys than the simple marginals. To
demonstrate what potentially is lost by aggregating the survey responses, we estimated bi-
nary probit models where the dependent variable is coded 1 for presidential approval, 0 for
disapproval; “don’t know” respondents were deleted from the analysis. Given the possibil-
ity of heterogeneity, we estimated heteroskedastic binary probit models (Alvarez and Brehm
1995, 1997; Brehm and Gronke 1995). The heteroskedastic probit model can be thought of as
comprising two separate components: a model of the response (the “systemic component”)
and a model of the response variance (the “variance component”).7
In the systemic component, we include variables which should account for how registered
voters evaluate incumbent presidents — their assessments of the current state of the national
economy, their assessments of their personal financial situation, and their partisan affiliations.
The first two we measure with simple scales (better, the same, or worse), while we add two
dummy variables for Democratic and Republican affiliation for the last. We expect to obtain
positive coefficients on all but the Democratic affiliation variable. For the specification of
the variance component, we included variables which measured how politically informed and
sophisticated the voter was with education, minority status, gender, and age. We expect to
see the better informed and sophisticated voters (higher education, non-minorities, males,
and older voters) to have less response variance.
We give model estimates (coefficient estimates and estimated probability “first differ-
ences”) from two of the 1988 Gallup polls in Table 2.8 In the left columns we present
estimates from the January 22-24, 1988 Gallup national poll, while in the right columns
we give similar estimates from the August 5-7 national poll. We use these two polls since
they are the national polls closest to the beginning and end of the campaign which share
these variables in common; the estimates, then, may shed some light on the dynamics of
presidential approval we observe in Figure 6.
In the January 22-24 Gallup poll, we see that the systemic component estimates are all
7Details of the heteroskedastic binary probit can be found in Alvarez and Brehm (1995, 1997).
8The probability “first differences” are calculated by setting a hypothetical respondent (all variables set
to sample mean values); we then estimate the probability of an “approve of” response twice, first by setting
the independent variable at the minimal value, second by setting the same variable at the maximal value.
We report in Table 2 the difference between these two probabilities.
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Table 2: Probit Estimates on the Probabilty of Approving of the President
Independent Jan 22-24 Jan 22-24 Aug 5-7 Aug 5-7
Variables Estimates Effects Estimates Effects
Systemic Component
Constant -2.57** -3.52**
.75 .83
Pers. Finances .79** .53 .63** .40
.22 .19
Natl. Economy .61** .42 1.21** .68
.20 .29
Democrats -1.29** -.30 -.78** -.18
.37 .31
Republicans 1.52** .26 .69** .14
.46 .29
Variance Component
Education .30** .26 .19* .19
.16 .13
Minorities -.22 -.20 .15 .15
.28 .22
Women .43** .55 -.12 -.14
.15 .12
Age -.59* -.44 -.21 -.18
.42 .38
Sample size 914 810
Het. Test 13.6† 4.59
Note: ** denotes p=.05 significance, and * p=.10 significance, both
one-tailed tests. † denotes a χ2 test significant at the p=.05 level with
4 degrees of freedom.
statistically significant and in the expected direction. That is, voters who thought their
personal finances or the national economy had gotten better were more likely to approve of
Reagan’s performance. Also, Republican identifiers were more likely to approve of Reagan’s
performance, with Democrats less likely to like the job Reagan had been doing. The proba-
bility estimates (second column) give us the ability to make better comparative assessments
about the relative effects of each variable in the systemic component. The critical conclusions
are that each of the economic factors have a larger effect on the likelihood of approval than
partisan affiliation; second, the effects of a voter’s pocketbook perceptions has a stronger
effect on the probability of approval than their perceptions of the national economy.
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The variance function produces similarly interesting results. First, however, notice that
we find evidence of significant heterogeneity in the January 22-24 survey data. Our test of
heterogeneity is statistically significant, and three of the four terms in the variance function
have statistically significant effects.9 We find that, as expected, women and younger voters
have higher response variance than males and older voters. This is consistent with the hy-
potheses that these voters are less informed, and as such, their responses have more variance
due to their fundamental uncertainty (Alvarez 1997). However, we also find that higher
educated voters have higher response variance than lower educated voters, which is inconsis-
tent with a political information and uncertainty explanation. It is possible, thought, that
higher educated voters at the beginning of this presidential campaign are more ambivalent,
or more internally torn, about whether they approve of Reagan’s job or not (Alvarez and
Brehm 1995, 1997). In any case, we see from our estimates of the effect of each variable on
the magnitude of the error variance (second column) that gender and age have much greater
effects on response variance than education.10
In the third and fourth columns we give the results from the August 5-7 Gallup survey.
The results in the systemic component look roughly similar to those from January, since again,
the coefficients are all statistically significant and in the anticipated direction. However,
when we turn to the probability “first differences”, we see some interesting changes. First,
the effects of partisan affiliation have diminished dramatically from the January results. In
fact, the effects of both partisan labels have been cut almost in half. Second, the effects of
both economic assessments are again stronger than partisanship. But third, in August, the
effects of the national economy now swamp the effects of the voter’s pocketbook perceptions.
Next, the variance function estimates in August show that there is no heterogeneity
in these data by this point in the general election campaign. While the estimate of the
effect of education is still positive and is greater than the associated standard error, the
heteroskedasticity test indicates no heterogeneity.
9The heteroskedascity test is discussed in Alvarez and Brehm 1995, 1997. It is a simple χ2 test of the
restriction that the coefficients in the variance function are zero. This is done by estimating the model again,
without the variance function, and by comparing the log-likelihood functions for the two models.
10These calculations were done much like the probability first differences; here we just estimate the different
between the estimated magnitude of the error variance for high and low values of each variable in the variance
function.
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Thus, three important changes seem to have occurred from January to August 1988.
First, the effect of partisanship on presidential approval diminished strongly. Second, the
effects of perceptions of the national economy strengthen, and the importance of personal
financial concerns weaken. Third, while there was significant heteroskedasticity in January,
there is none in August.
It is hard to attribute these changes to anything other than the 1988 presidential cam-
paign. Early in the presidential election, when there is little political information available,
presidential approval was determined by a voter’s personal financial condition, then by their
assessment of the national economy, followed by their partisanship. Also, there is solid evi-
dence of systematic error variance in January, which seems due to uncertainty and perhaps
ambivalence. But by August, after eight months of primary and general election campaigning,
presidential approval is now strongly determined by assessments of the national economy, fol-
lowed by personal financial conditions. Partisanship now matters much less. And last, there
is little evidence of systematic error variance at the end of the general election campaign.
These are all results which cannot be found by only concentrating on the aggregate-
level presidential approval series. Obviously our theories about presidential approval, and
what moves presidential approval, are theories about the opinions of individual citizens. To
test these theories, we should not be in the business of examining aggregate-level data and
making inferences about the opinions of these individual citizens. Indeed, for a long time
social scientists have known that making individual-level inferences from aggregated data is
highly problematic, since such “ecological” inferences often are incorrect (Achen and Shiveley
1995; King 1997). Instead, we ought to be examining the actual opinions of individuals; when
we do, we see that there seems to be much more going on at the individual level than seems
apparent in the aggregate presidential approval literature.
4. DISCUSSION OF SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES
In this paper we have argued that it makes little sense to think of presidential approval as
an integrated time-series. The concept of integration originated in economics to account for
the particular properties of many macroeconomic time-series; we have argued that the presi-
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dential approval time-series is a bounded series, and therefore cannot have infinite variance.
Instead, we have advanced two different ways to model presidential approval. There are
many questions about presidential approval which involve macro-political or macro-economic
phenomenon. For these questions, we believe that a panel approach to presidential approval
is appropriate. But many questions about presidential approval focus on individual voters
or citizens, and to answer these questions we should not rely on aggregate data. Instead
we need to turn to models of the individual data to best test those theories. Indeed, when
we turned to examinations of the presidential approval series either as a panel, or using the
individual-level survey responses, we produced some new and interesting findings.
In the end, however, we advocate the use of individual-level data for testing hypotheses
about presidential approval. Even when aggregate data is used in a methodologically appro-
priate manner — modeling it as a time-series cross-section and dealing with the fact that
the dependent variable is a proportion — there is still the nagging aggregation bias problem
which is impossible to diagnose using the aggregate approval data. It is the problematic
question of aggregation bias which we argue should keep researchers wary of using the survey
marginals in their research on approval.
But, presidential approval is an important concept in political science. It is integral
in discussions of presidential politics, of presidential-congressional interactions, and of elec-
toral politics. Given the conceptual importance of presidential approval in political science,
we need to develop appropriate methodologies to test our theories, not continue to borrow
techniques from economists.
Additionally, the cautionary tale we tell in this paper about how to model presidential
approval also applies to other areas of political research. Recent years have seen a rise in
the number of studies of other aggregated public opinion measures, ranging from different
aspects of public opinion studied at the aggregate level (Page and Shapiro 1992) to a number
of time-series studies of macro political opinions (e.g., Stimson 1998). While there is no
doubt that studying public opinion at the aggregate level is interesting and important, it is
clear that the methodological tools which are employed to study these phenomenon need to
carefully match the data at hand, not be drawn indiscriminately from other social sciences.
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